Longitudes: A Collection of Essays, Ideas and Writing in Progress

In terms of the study of emotions, Antonio Damasio describes the 20th century as “the century of neglect.” If the research of emotion is said to begin with Aristotle, then by the end of 19th century we have a body of work that includes the writings of Pascal, Spinoza, Darwin, Freud, Sartre and William James among many others. But all of this success in the study of emotions was cut short in the 20th century when the study of emotion was given increasingly short shrift by scientists and thinkers who embraced a philosophically outdated Cartesian model of the mind in order to support the computational theories of intelligence made so popular by the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950’s. Today, the computational model of the mind advocated by the strong AI theory and Chomsky’s theory of Universal Grammar, has been upset—-philosophically by Searle, Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus; in mathematics and physics by Penrose; and in the field of neuroscience by Damasio. Remarkable advances in brain study have provided us with a very different perspective––an emotional revolution, claims Damasio––which positions emotion as the very basis of reason. As the first mechanism of rational processes, it seems that emotion is a primal and practical necessity.

It is becoming clear that there are a whole host of medical ills that can be illuminated by emotional studies. Indeed, understanding how the emotional system works is crucial for the effective treatment stroke and mood disorders. Emotional studies have important applications in the social space as well; for while it is clear that what goes on in a culture economically, politically, and legally involves decisions that emerge out of rational processes, it seems that these rational processes evolve out of, and work alongside, emotional processes that have their origin in the survival of the organism; it appears that the way we produce moral behaviour is very closely tied to the emotional system in an evolutionary sense. Clearly, emotion has an immense role to play in our decisions as individuals and as a society; but how are we to understand this relationship between emotion and reason? What is an emotion? What is a feeling? And why is reason so dependent on both of them?

Damasio redefines the concept of emotion by amplifying its description into three categories:

1. Basic emotions––fear, anger happiness, as studied by Darwin and others––appear to be universal; even without the same names they are represented by the same behaviour in different cultures and even across certain species.
2. Background emotions, which are the most prevalent emotions we have. We are always in an emotional state, ie.discouragement or enthusiasm. Consciousness is always an emotive state.
3. Secondary or social emotions include compassion, shame, contempt, pride, and jealousy. These are entirely tied to social concerns, to those with whom and towards whom we act, others.

Secondary or social emotions were initially thought of as purely cultural constructions, but this has been shown to be not quite the case. While culture and education––the social environment as a whole––clearly plays an enormous role in directing the specifics of how emotions are applied, animal research has shown that a number of these emotions are present in primates who have been observed behaving compassionately, even towards other animals of other species. It seems as though these secondary emotions permeate our genetics and are as much a part of our biological make up as the primary emotions are.

Using William James as starting point, Damasio outlines the distinction and relationship between feeling and emotion–James’ inversion of the traditional view of the physiology of the emotion/feeling cycle has been been borne out by later research. James writes:

Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.

By interposing the body between the causative stimulus and the emotive mindstate, James shows the inseparability of mind and body; he also shows that body is represented in the brain, either directly or indirectly, and that the brain can map the body. However, James leaves out the possibility of an appraisal of the the stimulus itself. Although there is often no stimulus appraisal––fear may cause a direct body state––it does happen, especially when we are confronted with more complex situations. According to Damsio, James conflated emotion and feeling: on one hand James gives the impression that emotion is a variety of reactive behaviours; but then, on the other hand, he says that the perception that we get from the reaction is the emotion. This was shown to be an inconsistent view by the physiologists in the early 20th century.

In Damasio’s terms, emotion and feeling can be understood separately. Feelings involve cognition and are composite perceptions of:

1. partcular states of the body that are real or simulted
2. states of altered cognitive resouces
3. the deployment of certain scripts (descriptions) which can be really in the body or generated in the brain––ie. a desctiption of happiness
4. different states of cognitve ability in different body states––ie. time perception, learning attentiveness etc.
And all of this is connected to a causative state which is intentionality––how we feel ‘about’ or ‘towards’ something.

And human emotions are understood as:

1. largely unlearned programs of automatic actions and cognitive strategies aimed at the management of life. Largely but not 100% automatic––we can have some measure of control over them.
2. programs aimed at the management of life; one cannot do without emotions; they play an evolutionary role for the self and/or for the group
3. triggered by objects or situations that act on the mind, whether they are real or in the mind as a recollection; defects in particular aspects of emotion can be traced to lesions in certain parts of the brain.

In Damasio’s view, emotion involves an appraisal of stimulus, a triggering of emotion, and an execution of emotion and/or emotional states. Feeling involves an emotional trigger which stimulates brain structures to initiate a set of internal chemical changes which create changes to the viscera in the central nervous system. Thus, the experience of an emotion and the feeling associated with it involves a variety of changes in cognitive resources. Emotions change how we recall past experiences and perceive time; and they alter the relationship between our bodies and the world––even way in which we reason changes profoundly with emotive states. In brief, emotions and feelings change the way in which we attend to the world.

This relationship between emotion and feeling developed out of complex mechanisms of reaction built out of many other processes that were tied to survival: reward and punishment, scaling of internal needs, pain and pleasure. And it is certain that early creatures relied on such mechanisms long before emotions appeared as we understand them. In terms of survival, emotions and their components can be understood as exercising homeostatic or bodily regulating goals–they have everything to do with how an organism manages it’s life cycle. In our life cycle there is a mandate in our genome which drives us to persist and prevail––the emotional system is the latest expression in this blind desire to stay alive. As Damasio points out, the multitudes of cells in the body have a drive to persist, prevail and stay alive; to homeostaically manage the process of energy acquisition and transformation. This is the genesis of emotions and the birth of feeling: pleasure and pain.

It seems that there really is no separating mind, brain and body. The mind exists because there is a body; the body is the context for the mind/brain. The mind’s principle task is to examine and manage the internal economy of the organism. Feelings are always tied to the body, directly or indirectly; information about the body is so selective that it goes into specialised channels in the brain. Indeed, the brain creates chemical markers that have to do with specific bodily states. These markers allow the brain to carry out somatic perception which is key in the appraisal of stimulus (decision making) and the ability of emotional response to vary with context. Somatic-marker associations are reinstated, or recalled, physiologically and bias cognitive processing. In cases where complex and uncertain decisions need to be made, the somatic markers recall all reward and punishment experiences associated with the relevant stimuli, which are then summed to produce a net somatic state––that gut feeling. This overall state is used to direct (or bias) the selection of the appropriate action. Utilising the somatosensory cortex, the brain can even run internal simulations of responses or transformations in bodily states as representations in the mind. This is what Damsio terms the “as if ” body loop: it is as if the body was actually sensing or undergoing this or that experience recreated internally. This allows us not only to predict possible bodily or emotive states for ourselves but also to project them onto others. This clearly has relevance with regards to the secondary emotions outlined above as well as to predictive mental behaviour that rationalise potential outcomes.

According to Damasio, emotions are action programs which preceed feelings (which are the perception of these programs.) Emotions operate in multistage cycles and cannot be understood as being about or in one area of the brain that is a centre for this or that. They are modified by context––socialisation plays an important role––and reflect the ongoing management of life inside the organism; feelings give us a window into this internal life. Internal needs cannot be repressed. In the case of food, for example, the body declares a state of hunger because it wants to reach homeostasis and therefore lets this situation come into consciousness so that the mind can decide on appropriate action.

Cognitively speaking, we have multiple routes open to us. We have a fast route of decision making, which is biologically entrenched, and governed by powerful emotional, intuitive or “gut” responses to a given object or situation; and we have reason, traditionally understood as a slow methodical “cost-benefit” analysis. But these routes are not necessarily opposed to each other. In a healthy individual they work together in order to expedite the decision making process. Emotions also allow us to make decisions with out consciously confronting every option available to us; they allows us to freely and purposefully rationalise by removing or highlighting certain key options. Indeed, emotion seems to be the seat of practical reason itself; or, at the very least, it is the means by which it can function effectively. As some of Damasio’s patient studies have shown, damage to certain parts of the brain that are associated with emotion can have drastic effects in the realm of reasoning, both in terms of practical decision making and socialisation. And there have been those that, due to a break down in the somatic apparatus, have lost the ability to feel emotions while they can still intellectually understand their significance.

Emotion also plays a role in social processes that lead to social homeostasis. Most of our social engagements involve, to some degree at least, the projections into the social space of our biological needs. But the effectiveness and health of this social homeostasis would necessarily reflect the state of the culture itself and its emotional health and intelligence. It seems impossible, however, that a definitive account of this could be provided here. In the end it seems that everything we say about emotion needs to be put into context …

DAMASIO LECTURE: “Emotion, Feeling, and Social Behavior: The Brain Perspective”

DAMASIO LECTURE: MEDICINE TO SOCIETY I & II

Hubert Dreyfus on Merleau-Ponty, Computers and the mind:

PART II

Emotion research
Neuro science of emotion

Century of neglect … research of emotion starts with Aristotle.. end of 19th century we have William james , but also Darwin and freud after james… all of this success was cut short in the 20th century… emotion was given the cold shoulder especially in science..
comes from the fact that in the 50s we have the cognitive revolution … what have now is an emotional revolution which give a different perspective … in terms of reason … emotion is not inferior to reason… emotion is the basis of reason the first mechanism of reason… primal necessity
we have multiple roots… we have a fast route of decision making which is biologically entrenched and powerful.. and the reason , traditionally understood ( slow root) … not opposed to each other…
knowing about how the emotional system works is crucial for stroke, mood disorders etc..
practical medical importance … application in the social space, How we produce moral behaviour entirely tied to emotional system in an evolutionalry sense… what goes on economically , elections etc. jury system decisions … rational processes ?? emotional processes have an immense role to play in our decisions…
medical and social ills can be illuminated by emotional studies
What is an emotion ? What is a feeling?
reedefning the description of emotion by amplifying the description phenotype… basic emotion, fear, anger happiness studied by darwin and others , these are universal, even without the same name they are represented by the same behaviour

Also we have background emotions which are are actually the most prevalent emotions wew have : discourage ment or enthusiasm … we are always in an emotional state .. if we are concioiuss we are in an emotional state…. new group of emotions (secondary or social emotions) compassion, shame , contempt, pride , jealousy … entirely tied to socoiet and others toward whom we act (group)
was thought of a purely cultural … but this is not quite so… as much a part of our biological make up, as the primary emotions … but of course culture , education tunes … plays a role of directing the specifics of these emotions are applied.
How do we know this ?? research in animals that a number of these emotions are plresent in primates who rejects unfair behaivouer … chimps have behaved compassioately towards even other animals … genetics
physiology of the emotion/feeling cycle … James contributed ( made a mistake in terms of language )”our natural way of thinking about emotions is that hte mental perception of some facts of some facts excites the mental states of emotion and this gives rise to a bodily change .” , James : you percieve something that ought to cause fear in you bodily chages proceed directly after the prception… and our feeling IS the emotion…
James inverts the trad view : things go to a bodily reaction and then ther is an interpretation … and this is borne out by research …
then James interposes the body btween the causative stimulus and the emotive mindstate … cant separate mind and body… body is representd in the brain.. either directly or indirectly … brain can map the body… also a critical step
but james left out the possibility of an appraisal of the the stimulus, generally there is no appraisal but it does happen, fear may cause a direct body state but this does not happen all the time
conflated emotion and feeling … gives the ipression athet emotion is a vaiety of reactive behaviours but then says that the perception that we get from the recation is the emotion
this was shown to be inconsisten by the psyiologists in the early 20th century
emotion and feeling are separate …feeling is cognition over what has happened … human emotions are largely unlearned programs of aoutomatic actions and cognitive strategies aimed at the management of life… not 100p unleanred ,, automatic .. can have a measure of contreol but not 100p … even if facial expression is supressed etc… all of these programs are aimed at the management of life … you cannot do without emotions… evolutionary role ..for the self or for the group… 2 emotions are triggered by objects or situations that act on the mind (wether real or in the mind as a recollection that act on brian deviceds implemented by evolution) within certain ranges you need the stimulus wether apriori or not … seem to be the similar across many species … amygdala : is present in many other species … does fundamentally the same thing in all species … helps to trigger the appropriate response ( mostly concerned with fear) … defects in particular aspects of emotion can be traqced to lesions in certain parts of the brain.
amygdala
ventri medial frontal cortex
anterior cingula … disgust : rejection of abnormal poisonous protiens
triggering of emotion

4levels : appraisal of stimulus, tigger of emotion , excecution of emotion anf then emotional states
4 structure: trigger ––neeed brain structures , set of changes in the internal chemical changes which create changes in the viscera
central nervous system as you have an emotion you have a varity of changes in cognitiv resources … learning changes … do not attend to the world in the same way … changes the way we reason … emotions change how we recall
emotion is associated with subcortical to the … associated with lifife … emotional programs have , the regulation of life … built from simpler programs .. emotions don’t appear de nuovo … develop out of complex mechanisms of reaction that are built out of many other processes : reward and punishment , scaling of internakl needs… pain and pleasure … eary creatures had mechanisms of reward or punishment before emotions … and they were tied to survival.. long before happiness, sadness etc..
Emotions and thier components excersice homeostatic (bodily regulating goals )
when you have an emotion you recruit a long history of elements that came in the history of evolution with are about how an organism manages it’s life cycle
during our life cycle ther is a mandate in our genome with makes us persist and prevail … the desire to prevail… all of theis emotioal sysytem is the latest experssion inthe blind desire to stay alive … all the cells have this desire to stay alive and be home ststic… mam]nage the process of energy aquisition , process of transformation of energy … and tit is here that you find the genesis of emotions … whith pleasure , pain, punsishment an reward,
we have some controll over this, fear can go wrong , emotions can go wrong… but fear has saved more lives that it has destroyed

feelings are composite perceptions of: 1 a partcular states of the body that are real or simulted 2. state of altered cognitive resouces 3. the dply ment of certaimn scripts descriptions which can be really in the body or generated in the brain (desctiption of happiness) different states of cognitve ability in different body states.. time, learning attentiveness etc but all of this i connected to a causative state which is intentionality
psysiological changes : is waht james had in mind but did not distinguish between feeling and emotion …
“as if ” body loop: as if the body was actually senseing or undergoing this or that experience recreates internally stses of our own body … compassion for others.
brain exisst because there is a body … musty manage the internal economy … somatosensing ares bring the news of the body … feelings are always tied to the body , directly or indirectly
information about the body is so selective that it goes to specialised channel in the brain …
can have chemical markers for the pats of the brain that have to do wit tht einterior…
James, since … percieve stimulus, evaluate it … cortex carries out the somatic perceprion… depending on the contecxt the emotion will be different (appraisal of stimulus) … new! internal simulation… transfomations in the representations in the brain
… emotions are action programs which pereceed feelings… which are the perception of these programs … they operate in multistage cycles …never about one area that is a center for this or that … modified by context … socialisation plays an important role … emotions reflect the ongoing manage ment of life inside the organism … feelings give us a window into this internal life

early on as a result of certain gene traits we have been able to employ a scaling mechanism of reward an punishment , of need…. role in social processes leads to social home stasis as well… internal needs cannot be repressed , like food, body declares a state of hunger because it wants to make homeo stasis … lets this situation come into consciousness

but to social homeo stsis … managing social relationships … most of our engagements social lly the projections into the social space of our bio needs …. we have to deal with these things or else we die … how do we transfer this into the social realm… high pitched reject cost benefit analysis in which conflict situations(throw the guy off the raft) … so everything we say av.=bnout emotion needs to be put into context …

Freedom, Belief, and Emotions: Phenomenology and the Mind

Dostoyevsky’s Notes From the Underground attacks the enlightenment’s claim that freedom and happiness are synonymous by showing that in reality these two concepts stand in opposition to one another. Happiness, Dostoevsky claims, is the absence of freedom. He introduces us to the underground man, a mean and spiteful individual who, in a relentless quest to maintain and exert the integrity of his personal freedom, systematically destroys every chance he has for happiness by irrevocably alienating his peers and brutally shunning his only chance for love; he suffers from a disease of the liver but refuses to see a doctor, proclaiming “let it get worse!” Dostoevsky takes on the enlightenment myth which claims that rationality and freedom can be structured as an equation for human happiness and the creation of an ideal society: “2+2=4, as if that is what is most important to us.” If it is our personal liberty that we cherish above all; and if the freedom of the will is to be understood as our most precious and humanising characteristic; do we not render ourselves, in some sense, inhuman when we blindly adhere to a role as part of the grand plan for the ideal society?

Dostoevsky makes it eerily clear that by going along with the enlightenment schema that which is “our most advantageous advantage” is, in fact, paradoxically left out of the equation only to be replaced by an subverted concept of freedom that is all but meaningless. If the enlightenment’s myth of liberty twists the notion of freedom––consciously or otherwise––into something resembling its antithesis in order to create social contentment, the underground man responds to this subversion with a resounding “No!” For him freedom is the very foundation of being human––to sacrifice it in order to acquiesce to society is impossible: true individuality, wretched and miserable though may be, is the highest good.

Although he is tempted from time to time to resolve himself socially, ultimately the underground man is would rather face the depravity of a life of spite than submerge himself in what he considers to be disingenuous social conventions and artificial hierarchies. And, of course, from the perspective of the underground man, there is no depravity; his position is only understood as perverse from the point of view of the enlightened rationalists who value social cohesion over the richness of true individuality. Thus, Dostoevsky presents the emotion of spite, not simply as an emotional disorder, but as a philosophical principle which allows the underground man to exercise freedom even in the face of his own personal interests. Indeed, even the expected course of action his physical ailment would seem to demand presents a challenge to the freedom of the will and is therefore rejected by the underground man in an affirmation of his existence.

In the final analysis, the underground man is rendered impotent, incapable of any kind of coherent active engagement with the world. Making choices which can be made manifest in action involves making predictions and judgements which are value laden, often involving moving or changing one’s self––physically as well as psychologically––in relation to the Other; the underground man finds that he cannot realise the simplest decision because in doing so he would have to relinquish his freedom by recognising the Other or the group. This terrifies and disgusts him above all else. Additionally, we should consider that understanding, choosing and acting are highly emotionally charged activities which involve some sort of compromise, acquiescence or coming to terms with the position of an Other, or some situation which is beyond the immediate control of the self. The emotions associated with such circumstances are pushed aside by the underground man with disgust; he regards them with horror and allows himself only spite. When he must give in to his emotions, as in the waning moments of the story when he his finally confronted with the possibility of love and happiness––and not only his own, but also that of the young prostitute whom his decision will profoundly affect––he crumbles, collapsing in tears. In the end, the underground man refuses everything except his own will; ironically rejecting his only real chance to make his existence felt by another, he chooses to remain in the misery, and wretched safety of spite.

Dostoevsky’s critique of the Western european concepts of freedom and happiness echoes throughout his work. And, when we consider the way in which he extends this critique of happinesss and freedom to the Roman Catholic Church in the Grand Inquisitor, we begin to understand that, for Dostoevsky, freedom, happiness and self affirmation rest in the realm of a personal and spiritual understanding of God and Creation. Like Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky asserts that true individuality has a profound spiritual element which trancends the ‘herd’ mentality and distractions of daily existence. But, as we have seen, Dostoevsky’s underground man also offers us a subtil critique of the relationship between emotion and reason, and it is this relationship that the remainder of this essay will deal with.
As the underground man makes so painfully clear, the concept that emotions are in the mind, that they are can be negated rationally, or that they can be made to take on predictable or instumental roles is a questionable claim. But, on the other hand can we really understand our selves as being completly controlled by our emotions like Goethe’s Werther? <<<>>>

The Cartesian conception of the mind leads us to the conclusion that we are closest and most aware of our own experience and that we know this experience beyond doubt. But this position has itself been cast into doubt by, among others, Freud and Hiedegger. If Descartes asserts that emotiions are in the mind and only in the mind, then Hiedegger wants to offer a unified picture of being. As much as Cartesian dualism seems an innate part of the Western mind, we must consider that for Aristotle the distinction between mind and body would not have been understood in the Cartesian sense. Aristotle discusses the soul, but the soul is not seen as being necssiarily distinct from the creature itself––it describes form and esence. Indeed, even for Augustine, whose inward retreat into Christianity and rejection of the desires of the body can certainly be seen as a precursor to Descartes, this mind/body distinction is not clearly defined. This is not to say, however, that Aristotle and Augustine did not beleive in the emotions; they both spend a great deal of time discussing emotions, but there is never the sense that these emotions are simply and only products of the mind, rather they appear more like experiences of the world which we are obliged to form understandings of as modalities of being. Hiedegger, in a sense, wants to return to this understanding of experience as an immediate unity of being in the world.

Cartesian dualism refuses this position, claiming that the contents of our minds are all we can know immediately and that our knowledge of bodies, the world, and other people can only be understood as being mediated by our senses; the external world can only be understood as an inference, and this leads to skepticism about whether or not we can know anything for certain exterior to our minds. But Freud stikes what seems like a fatal blow to the claim that we can even be sure of the contents of our own minds. Like Copernicus and Darwin, who respectively shattered mankind’s assumptions about his elite place in the cosmos and nature, Freud’s claims remove humanity from its special position in conciousness and sheds doubt on the assumption that we are the masters of our own minds. Because emotions are necissarily fragmented by feeling, understanding and, ultimately, by the experssive form they take, Freud also questions the assumption that our understanding of the meaning of our emotions is consistent. Indeed, cultural and social variable could play and enormous role here as well. Considering this perspective it is very difficuclt to understand emotion as simply an internal mental state whose nature and meaning is secure.

Well before Freud emerged on the european intellectual scene, philosophers had aready begun to rebel against the Cartesian position. Kant refuted Descartes by introducing the phenomenal view of understanding experience, positing that the world cannot be understood in any way other than how we experience it––the world is phenomenal, an experience, and it cannot be proprly considered as a thing in itself. Hegel’s phenoemenology continues and attemps to complete the work of Kant. Abandoning the hierarchichal notion of inner and outer experience, Hegel views experience itself as being in the world as phenomena. For Hegel, it makes no sense to draw the distinction of things in themselves because in order for the phenomenon experience to occur there can be no separation between the mind and the world. Husserl developed phenomenology into a discipline which attempts to describe our experience as it is; but beacause experience is necissarily of the world it is always intentional with regards to the world. Interestingy, however, Husserl was working to reestablish a version of Cartesianism,

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Existentialist phenomenology, as put forward by Sartre, critiques and extends the Husserlian method by taking the position that a phenomenological examination of consciousness must take the world into account in terms of action, not simply passive intention. Emotions are our own actions are ways in which we , what abou the body, Emotions are acts which allow us to escape from the world<<<spite or resent ment as a kind of escape, and act of esacpe, oppsed to james its not the physiology that gives rise to the behiviour, but it is the recoginton of the situation . Like Heidegger, Sartre, leans towards the view that consciousness and the world are, in fact, a unified phenomenon and, as a result, there is no separating them; that even in attempting to ‘bracket’ conscious phenomena out of common notions of reality we cannot neglect the innate unity of what we have separated. However, EP in also continues the tradition of the Cartesian dichotomy between the consciousness and the world, creating what often seems to be an infuriating paradox––on one hand Sartre embraces Heidegger’s Dasein; on the other he extends the Cartesian distinction between Mind and World. Despite the virtuosic and often confusing double talk Sartre employs to deal with this apparent contradiction, Sartre is always clear about the ultimate point of his thought which rests firmly in his concepts freedom and responsibility. For Sartre consciousness is freedom and responsibility is the idea that we are the sole authors of our actions––we must accept the consequences of our actions; there are no excuses.

Like Husserl, Sartre’s concept of consciousness requires intentionality–-it is always about the things and concerns of the world. But, for EP this is not a Husserlian realm like the transcendental ego, rather it is pure activity: an active, dynamic awareness of the things of the world. Thus EP views the phenomenon of emotion as imposing itself on the world, transforming it according to a subjective scheme. By postulating consciousness as nothingness Sartre manages to separate it from the realm of worldly causality. In order to protect his conception of freedom, it is crucial to For Sartre see consciousness as independent from the causal relations of the word, as distinct from the deterministic laws of physics. Echoing Ant, Sartre takes the position that, as we see ourselves as something distinct from the causal categories we impose on matter, we are obliged to make the distinction between the objective or scientific view and the perspective of active, subjective, first person engagement. Therefore, from the point of view of Existentialist phenomenology, consciousness itself can be in no way considered as an object of consciousness––hence the break with Husserl––and, more importantly, it cannot be understood as being caused. Thus consciousness is freedom itself.
Sartre’s conception of freedom allows him to introduce the concept that all action is chosen, and that the choices we make are often pre-reflective. Sartre removes causality from motivation and emotion, and––perhaps in an attempt to find a middle ground between physical determinism and the freedom of consciousness––describes them as “the terms by which” we make the choices that we do. An obvious argument emerges at this point: if motivation and emotion set the terms by which by which we make conscious choices, does that not imply––at least indirectly––causality? Sartre responds that emotions are not causes of behaviour but rather they are “spontaneous out pourings of consciousness in which one takes the world in a certain way.” For Sartre, emotions are a way of structuring consciousness, <> tbc

Dostoyevsky’s Notes From the Underground attacks the enlightenment’s claim that freedom and happiness are synonymous by showing that in reality these two concepts stand in opposition to one another. Happiness, Dostoevsky seems to say, is the absence of freedom. He introduces us to the underground man, a mean and spiteful individual who, in a relentless quest to maintain and exert the integrity of his personal freedom, systematically destroys every chance he has for happiness by irrevocably alienating his peers and brutally shunning his only chance for love; he suffers from a disease of the liver but refuses to see a doctor, proclaiming “let it get worse!” Dostoevsky takes on the enlightenment myth which claims that rationality and freedom can be structured as an equation for human happiness and the creation of an ideal society: “2+2=4″ the underground man mutters, “as if that is what is most important to us.” Dostoevsky poses the following dilemma: if it is our personal liberty that we cherish above all; and, if the freedom of the will is to be understood as our most precious and humanising characteristic, do we not render ourselves, in some sense, inhuman when we blindly adhere to a role as part of the grand plan for the ideal society?

Dostoevsky makes it eerily clear that by going along with the enlightenment schema that which is “our most advantageous advantage” is, in fact, paradoxically left out of the equation, only to be replaced by an subverted concept of freedom that is all but meaningless. If the enlightenment’s myth of liberty twists the notion of freedom––consciously or otherwise––into something resembling its antithesis in order to create social contentment, the underground man responds to this subversion with a resounding “No!” For him freedom is the very foundation of being human, to sacrifice it in order to acquiesce to society is impossible; true individuality, wretched and miserable though may be, is the highest good.

Although he is tempted from time to time to resolve himself socially, the underground man would rather face the depravity of a life of spite than submerge himself in what he considers to be disingenuous social conventions and artificial hierarchies. But of course, from the perspective of the underground man, there is no depravity––his position is only understood as perverse from the point of view of the enlightened rationalists who value social cohesion over the richness of true individuality. Thus, Dostoevsky presents the emotion of spite, not simply as an emotional disorder, but as a philosophical principle which allows the underground man to exercise freedom even in the face of his own personal interests. Indeed, even the expected course of action his physical ailment would seem to demand presents a challenge to the freedom of the will and is therefore rejected by the underground man in an affirmation of his existence.

In the final analysis, the underground man is rendered impotent, incapable of any kind of coherent active engagement with the world. Making choices manifest in action involves making predictions and judgements which are value laden, often involving moving or changing one’s self––physically as well as psychologically––in relation to the Other; the underground man finds that he cannot realise the simplest decision because in doing so he would have to relinquish his freedom by recognising the Other or the group. This terrifies and disgusts him above all else. Understanding, choosing and acting are highly emotionally charged activities which involve some sort of compromise, acquiescence or coming to terms with the position of an Other, or situations which are beyond the immediate control of the self. The emotions associated with such circumstances are pushed aside by the underground man with disgust; he regards them with horror and allows himself only spite. But when spite cannot protect him; when he must face his emotions in the waning moments of the story when he his finally confronted with the possibility of love and happiness––not only his own, but also that of the young prostitute whom his decision will profoundly affect––he collapses in tears. In the end, the underground man refuses everything except his own will; ironically rejecting his only real chance to make his existence meaningful to another, he chooses to remain in the misery, and wretched safety of spite.

Dostoevsky’s critique of the Western european concepts of freedom and happiness echoes throughout his work. And, when we consider the way in which he extends this critique of happiness and freedom to the Roman Catholic Church in the Grand Inquisitor, we begin to understand that, for Dostoevsky, freedom, happiness and self affirmation rest in the realm of a personal and spiritual understanding of God and Creation. Like Augustine, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky asserts that true individuality has a profound spiritual element which transcends the ‘herd’ mentality of popular religion, rational rhetoric and the material distractions of daily existence.

Dostoevsky’s underground man also offers us a subtle critique of the relationship between emotion and reason. As the underground man makes so painfully clear, the concept that emotions can be negated rationally, or that they can be made to take on predictable or instrumental roles is a questionable claim. But, on the other hand, can we really understand our selves as being completely controlled by our emotions like Goethe’s Werther? Both young Werther and the Underground man live at the limits of their subjective existence. But where the Underground man is capable of retreating from the unyielding social and physical world that surrounds him into his disgusting metaphysical burrow of spite and resentment, Werther’s only escape is death.

Werther’s suicide, however,cannot be properly understood as a simple evasion. While the Underground man asserts his existence by lacerating himself from the world through rational denial, eventually coming to rest in spite; Werther can only exist at the extremities of feeling. For Werther, the world itself transforms according to his emotions. When he is happy he sees only beauty; even the hard life of the peasants in the village seem charming to him. But when he is sad the world becomes cold and indifferent. Although joy and sorrow are his only proper domains, Wether’s narcissism transcends all. His infantile longings, coupled with his need rationalise his reality around his extreme emotive states dooms his chances of contentment in the working world of bourgeois society; and the possibility of a reasonable friendship with Lotte is rendered impossible. Dostoevsky and Goethe offer insight into the profound contribution of emotion to subjective experience. Psychologically speaking, emotion seems to both protect us from the world and allow us physical engagement with it; emotions allow us to form understandings of the world which permit us to act according to some rational schema. However, as the pathological cases of the Underground man and Werther make clear, the relationship between emotion and reason can be a dangerous one when it creates an understanding of the world in which the individual cannot properly integrate himself physically or socially. How then are we to understand this relation ship between reason, emotion and the mind? Are emotions simply products of the mind, or are they integrated responses to the world? Are emotions in some sense chosen, or are they biologically determined? Are emotions purely subjective experiences or do they adhere to some set of social, biological or psychological determiners?